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Abstract

Failsafing devices (or poka-yok£ devices) are used to inspect the conditions for high quality
production (source inspection) or for inspecting work as it is completed to provide the fastest
possible feedback (seJ.t:checks). These techniques involve 100% inspection and are economical
only if the cost of inspection is vecy low. In this research, processes that have attributes as a

primary quality characteristic are considered An existing model for the economic design of
np-charts will be used to determine how low inspection costs must be before seJ.t:checks
become economical An existing model for checking proper operating conditions will be used
to find how low the cost of source-inspection must be in order for it to be economical

I

1. Introduction

Setup time reduction is one of the techniques that is usually associated with the Just-in-time
(JIT) approach to production and inventory management. The critical insight that made JIT

practical was the realization that setup times for production nms, which had previously been
assumed to be fixed, could be reduced by management. By reducing setup times, smaller lot
sizes, and the attendant flexibility to respond more effectively to changing customer demand,
could be economically justified.

Shigeo Shingo was one of the industrial engineers at Toyota who has been credited with
identifYing setup time reduction as a step in improving manufacturing flexibility and efficiency.
Shingo was also largely responsible for creating and fonnalizing Zero Quality Control (ZQC),
an approach to quality management that relies heavily on the use of poka-yoke (pronounced
POH-kah YOH-kay) devices. Poka-yoke is Japanese for mistake-proofing. Poka-yoke is also
commonly called failsafing [1,2]. These devices are used either to prevent the special causes
that resuh in defects, or to inexpensively inspect each item that is produced to determine
\Wether it is acceptable or defective.

Effective poka-yoke devices reduce the cost of

inspection, making it economical to increase both the frequency and quantity of inspection. If
the cost can be reduced enough, 100% inspection may become economically viable. Thus

poka-yoke devices may potentially have an effect on statistical process control

(SPC)

analogous to the effect setup time reduction had on the frequency and length of production
nms in manufacturing. Shingo believed that dramatically improved quality levels would resuh
ftom using 100% inspection as part of ZQC .
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A poka-yoke device is any mechanism that either prevents a mistake from being made or makes
the mistake obvious at a glance. The ability to find mistakes at a glance is essential because, as
Shingo writes, '"Th.e causes of defects lie in worker errors, and defects are the resuhs of
neglecting those errors. It follows that mistakes will not tum into defects if worker errors are
discovered and eliminated beforeband1"[3, p.50]. He later continues that ''Defects arise because
errors are made; the two have a cause-and-effect relationship .... Yet errors will not tum into
defects iffeedback and action take place at the error stage"[3, p. 82].

An example cited by Shingo early in the development of poka-yoke shows how finding

mistakes at a glance helps to avoid defects. Suppose a worker must assemble a device that has
two push-buttons. A spring must be put under each button. Sometimes a worker will forget
to put the spring under the button and a defect occurs. A simple poka-yoke device to eliminate
this problem was developed. The worker counts out two springs from a bin and places them in

a small dish. After assembly is complete, if a spring remains in the dish, an error has occurred.
The operator knows a spring has been omitted and can correct the omission immediately. The
cost of this inspection (looking at the dish) is minimal, yet it effectively functions as a form of
inspection. The cost of rework at this point is also minimal, although the preferred outcome is

still to find the dish empty at the end of assembly and to avoid rework even when its cost is
small. This example also demonstrates that poka-yoke performs well when corrective action
involves trying to eliminate oversights and omissions. In such cases, poka-yoke devices are

We suspect that Shingo and Deming would have a protracted discussion about 'Mled1er worlcers or management are
responmble for defects. No resolution of that issue is undertaken here.
1
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often an effective alternative to demands for greater worker diligence and exhortations to ''be
more careful"

An example of a poka-yoke device at General Motors (GM) was described by Ricard [4]:

'We have an operation which involves welding nuts into a sheet metal panel
These weld nuts will be used to attach parts to the car later in the process.
When the panel is loaded by the operator, the weld nuts are fed automatically
mdemeath the panel, the machine cycleS; and the weld nuts are welded to the
panel You must remember these nuts are fed automatically and out of sight of
the operator, so ifthe equipment jams or misfeeds and there is no part loaded,
the machine will still cycle. Therefore, we have some probability of firilure of
the process. An error ofthis nature is sometimes not detected mtil we actually
have the car welded together and are about to attach a part \Were there is not a
nut for the boh to fit into. This sometimes results in a major repair or rework
activity.
To correct this problem, we simply dri1led a hole through the electrode that
holds the nut that is attached to the panel in the welding operation. We put a
wire through the hole in the electrode, insulating it away from the electrode so
as it passes through it will only make contact with the weld nut. Since the weld
nut is metal, it conducts electricity and with the nut present, current will flow
through, allowing the machine to complete its cycle. If a nut is not present,
there will be no current flow. We tiy to control the process so that the machine
will actually remain idle liDless there is a nut in place."
Shingo identified three different types of inspection: judgment inspection, informative
inspection, and source inspection. Judgment inspection involves sorting the defects out of the
acceptable product, sometimes referred to as "inspecting in quality." Shingo agreed with the
consensus in modem quality control that "inspecting in quality'' is not an effective quality
management approach, and cautioned against it.
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Informative inspection uses data gained from inspection to control the process and prevent
defects. Traditional SPC is a type of informative inspection. Both successive checks and se1f:.
checks in ZQC are also a type of informative inspection. Successive checks were Shingo's
response to the insight that improvements are more rapid when quality feedback is more rapid
[3, pp. 67-69]. Work-in-process undergoes many operating steps as it is moved through a
manufacturing facility. Often inspections are conducted at intermediate stages in the process.
Shingo's concern was that the inspections may not occur soon enough after production to give
the best information necessa.ty to determine the cause of the quality problem so that it can be
prevented in the future. By having each operation inspect the work of the prior operation,

quality feedback can be given on a much more timely basis. Successive checks are having the
nearest downstream operation check the work ofthe prior operation. Each operation performs
both production and quality inspection. Effective pok£1-yoke devices make such an inspection
system poSSll>le by reducing the time and cost of inspection to near zero. Because inspections
entail minimal cost, every item may be inspected Provided that work-in-process inventories
are low, quality feedback used to improve the process can be provided very rapidly.

While successive checks provide rapid feedback, having the person who performs the
production operation check their own work provides even faster feedback. Se1f:.checks use

pok£1-yoke devices to allow workers to assess the quality of their own work. Because they
check every unit produced, operators may be able to recognize what conditions changed that
caused the last unit to be defective. This insight is used to prevent further defects. Se1f:.checks
are preferred to successive checks whenever possible.
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Since the main difference between successive checks and seif:.checks is which work station
performs the inspection, in this research we do not distinguish between the two types of
informative inspection. From an economic perspective, the difference between them will have
a minimal effect on their cost. Thus we confine our discussion to seif:.checks while making the
obseiVation that our conclusions apply to successive checks as weD.

Both successive and seif:.checks provide information "after the filet." Source inspection
determines beforehand whether the conditions necessaty for high quality production exist2•
Shingo writes, ''It had dawned on me that the occurrence of a defect was the result of some
condition or action, and that it would be poSSJ."ble to eliminate defects entirely by pursuing the
cause" [3, p.50]. He further writes that ''I realized that the idea of checking operating
conditions before the operations rather than after them was precisely the same as my concept
of source inspection" [3, p.51].

WJth source inspection, poka-yoke devices ensure that proper operating conditions exist prior

to actual production. Often these devices are also designed to prevent production from
occuning until the necessaty conditions are satisfied. Norman [5] refers to this type of device
as a ''forcing fimction." The example from GM that ''forces" the nut to be present before
welding can occur is an example of source inspection.

Shingo's use of the term source inspection is not the practice of having the buyer's tqnesentative inspect
the quality of\WI'k-in-progress at the supplier's &cili1y, which is also caUed source inspection
2Note that
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Source inspection, self-checks, and successive checks are inspection techniques used to
understand and manage the production process more effectively. Each involves inspecting 100
percent of the process output. In this sense, zero quality control is a misnomer. These
inspection techniques are intended to increase the speed with which quality feedback is
received. And although every item is inspected, Shingo was emphatic that the pwpose of the
inspection is to improve the process and prevent defects, and therefore is not intended to sort
out defects (although in some cases that may also be an outcome) [3, p. 57]. Shingo believed
that source inspection is the ideal method of quality control since quality feedback about
conditions for quality production is obtained before the process step is performed. Source
inspection is intended to keep defects from occurring. Self-checks and successive checks
provide feedback about the outcomes of the process. Self-checks and successive checks should
be used when source inspection cannot be done or when the process is not yet well enough

understood to develop source inspection techniques. Additional information about ZQC and
failsafing is provided by Robinson & Schroeder [6], Bandyopadhyay [7], Chase & Stewart [1,
8], and Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun/Factocy Magazine [9].

In Shingo's seminal book on ZQC [3], he criticized SPC and suggested that ZQC should

supplant SPC as the preeminent tool for defect elimination in quality control His main
argument against SPC was that it is by nature an intermittent form of inspection, and therefore
allows for some number of defects to occur. He further argued that SPC is designed to
maintain the current level of defects , rather than to aggressively seek to eliminate them. In

addition, Shingo claimed that "...a look at SQC methods as they are actually applied shows that
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feedback and corrective action - the crucial aspects of informative inspections - are too slow to
be fully effective." [3, p.68]

Given the fact that applications of SPC generally have substantial intervals between the taking
of samples, it seems reasonable to argue that feedback will be faster with source inspection and
informative inspection in ZQC. However, it is not clear that ZQC should be systematically
faster than SPC at insuring corrective actions. Indeed, according to Shingo [3, p. 71], ''Defects
will never be reduced if the workers involved do not modifY operating methods when defects

occur." The willingness to take corrective action is a function of the attitude and co•mni1•••ent
of both managers and workers, not an intrinsic attribute of a particular approach to quality
management. Shingo's complaint about the actual implementation of SPC may also apply to
ZQC.

To this point, no researchers have attempted to reconcile Shingo's contracy views on SPC with
traditional thinking, nor have the economic implications of ZQC been rigorously explored.
This research demonstrates that certain elements of ZQC can be viewed as special cases of
traditional SPC using attribute data. An analysis of ZQC using traditional economic models of
SPC will show that there are cases where ZQC is appropriate, and other cases where
traditional SPC methods provide the most economical and effective process control

It will be shown that for processes that are controlled using attnoute data, seJf:checks can be
treated as a special case of an np-chart. Existing models for the economic design of np-charts
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due to Chiu [10] and Thmcan [11] will be used to demonstrate that inspection cost can reduced
sufficiently to make self-checks become economical

This research will also explore the economics of source inspection. An existing model for

checking proper operating conditions, due to Iyer and Vecchia [12], will be used to
demonstrate how low the cost of source inspection must be in order for it to be economical

This paper first presents a brief review of the relevant literature on the economic design of

control charts. In the next section, our strategy for examining self-checks in the context of the
economic design of control-charts for attribute data is discussed. The economics of source
inspection are then presented, followed by conclusions.

2. Economic design of control charts

Control charts were invented by Shewhart [13] and form the basis of SPC methodology.
Variable charts are used when the characteristics of the process being controlled may be
expressed as measurements. Attribute charts are used when the characteristics of the process
being controlled may be expressed as the outcome of a Bernoulli trial, typically as defective or
non-defective. The basic control chart methodology is that samples of a fixed size n are taken
at some regu]ar interval and a sample statistic (e.g., a sample mean or the number of defective
items in the sample) is computed and plotted on a chart. The resulting graph is therefore a
time series plot. The unique feature of control charts are predetermined control limits, often set
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three standard deviations from some measure of central tendency. If a plotted point fuDs
outside of these control limits it is called an out-of-control signal Such a signal must be either
an extremely unlikely occurrence in a normally functioning process, or else an indication that
some new source of variation has entered the process (ie., a special or assignable cause)
causing it to produce output that deviates from the desired specification. This will frequently
lead to an increase in the amount of defective output. The typical response to an out-of.
control signal is therefore to go investigate the process and 1Iy to identifY and remove the
assignable cause.

The choice of a sample size, of an interval between samples (expressed as either a period of
time or as a number of units of production), and of appropriate control limits is called the
design of a control chart.

A substantial amount of research has examined the optimal

economic design of control charts, where optimal is defined as the design that minimizes the
total operating cost of the sampling design, expressed either as a cost per hour or as a cost per
unit ofproduct.

The first economic mode~ proposed by Duncan [14], was an example of the former. Under
the assumption that only one assignable cause would be present, a loss-cost function for x-bar
charts was developed and then minimized using numerical methods.

Other researchers

working with x-bar charts have included Chiu and Wetherill [15], Gibra [16], and more
recently Lorenzen and Vance [17].
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Ladany [18] developed an economic model for attn'bute data using p-charts. Chiu [10] and
Duncan [11] present economic designs for np-charts.

These models are similar in their

derivation to the approach ofDuncan [14]. The three components of cost fimctions included
by these researchers are discussed below.

The first, which we may call inspection costs, are those costs, both :fixed and variable, arising
directly from taking a sample and calculating the appropriate statistics. With the possible
exception of destructive testing, the primary cost is the time of the operator collecting the
sample. Inspection costs are influenced by both the sample size and by the size of the
interval between samples. It is important to note that a necessacy condition for Shingo's ZQC
to be effective is a drastic reduction in sampling cost. ZQC or any other 100% inspection
technique cannot be used for destructive testing.

Search and repair costs are those costs which arise from responding to an out-of:control signal
from a control chart. These costs have two components. The first is the expense inCWTed
investigating the out-of:control signal and locating the assignable cause. Models exist for
situations where the process is stopped while remedial action is taken to eliminate assignable
causes, and also the case where the process will continue to operate while the assignable cause
is identified and corrected Gibra [19, 20] has recently proposed ahemative models for each

case which can be used in the economic design of attn'bute control charts. The other cost
component is the expense inCWTed when responding to an out-of:control signal when no
assignable cause is present.

Since statistical control charts test the hwothesis that no
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assignable causes are present, a false alarm is a Type I error. These costs are a function of the
frequency with which the process goes out-of:.control, and also of the risk of a Type I error as
determined by the control limits. Type I error search costs increases as the sampling interval
decreases. The practical problem of increased Type I error when 100% inspection is used was
identified by Papadakis [21]. Not all models differentiate between the cost of locating an
assignable cause and the cost of investigating a false alarm, ahhough it is reasonable to believe
the costs will be different.

Defect costs are those costs which arise as a resuh of firiling to detect the presence of an
assignable cause and consequently producing defective items. Like any method based on
statistical inference, control charts are wlnerable to Type IT error. This may occur when an
assignable cause is present and one or more samples are taken which do not resuh in an
out-of:.control signal

The presence of an assignable cause will generally resuh in the

production of an increased number of defective items until its presence is detected and
corrected.

Montgomecy [22] wrote a review and swvey of the control chart literature. Several important
conclusions were presented about the various models that have been proposed. While the
economic models of x-bar charts have been more extensively researched, the following
observations appear to be valid for all types of control charts. Montgomecy [22] reports that
the cost functions are generally flat in the vicinity of the oprinDim, making the models
insensitive to estimates of the cost coefficients. He also reports that these functions tend to be
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steeper in the vicinity of the origin, making it better to overestimate rather than 1mderest:imate
the cost parameters. Second, it is reported that the cost models are fairly sensitive to estimates
of the process parameters. In the case of x-bar charts these are the magnitude of the process

shift d, the in-control process mean xo, and the in-control process standard deviation a:
Fortlmately, these parameters may generally be estimated with greater precision than the cost
parameters. Finally, Montgomery [22] notes that economic models are generaJly insensitive to
the number of out-of:.control states included in the model He writes that (p. 81)
...it seems reasonable to conclude that very complex nmhi-st:ate processes can be
satisfactorily approximated by a model containing only a few states, provided those
states are properly defined.
The question of \Wether or not a model should assume that a process will be stopped while
assignable causes are investigated is process specific.

3. The economics of self-checks for attribute data

An economic design of an np-chart specifies the sample size, the acceptance number (the

number of defects in a sample \\hlch triggers an out-of:.control signal), and the interval between
samples. If n is the sample size, h is the time between samples in nmltiples of the time to
produce one 1IDit and dis the acceptance number, then selt:checks are equivalent to an np-chart
\\here

IF 1, h

=1, d=O. Further reference to the design ofnp-charts will use the vector (n,h,d).

According to Shingo [3], a poka-yok£ device nmst: be used to inspect each item to determine
\Wether it is acceptable or defective. If the 1IDit being inspected is defective, Shingo indicated
that remedial action should be taken to detect the cause of the defect and to insure that this
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cause is eliminated. Since each unit is inspected, the time inteiVal between samples is the time
required to produce one unit of output. Thus using a poka-yoke device to inspect for the
presence of product attnbutes can be viewed as an instance of an np-chart 'With a sampJing
design of(1,1,0).

The economic models ofnp-control chart design considered by Chiu [10] and Duncan [11] are
very similar. Both are an extension the economic design of x-bar chart research of Duncan
[14] to np-charts.

The primary difference between the two models is that Duncan assumes

that the process continues while a search for an assignable cause is undertaken. Chiu's model
includes separate terms to account for the cost incurred by stopping the process to search for
an assignable cause. We use both in our analysis to emphasize that the economic implications

ofpoka-yoke are invariant for the two scenarios. The complete formulations of Duncan's cost
fimction l.(n,h,d) and Chiu's cost function F(n,h,d) are both shown in the appendix.

Because of the complexity of the cost functions involved, most of the research in the
economic design of control charts has not resulted in analytic solutions. The optimal
sampling designs have been found using enumerative search methodologies. Even the
generalizations that have been made in this area by Montgomery [22] use numerical
examples to draw conclusions. Since both the Duncan and the Chiu models have so far
proven to be intractable, the results which follow are based on a numerical analysis of
examples from Duncan [11] and Chiu [10], which are presented below in Table 1. The Duncan
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parameters sets are listed by their number from Duncan's paper. Chiu only provides a single
example parameter Get.

The possible solutions to the economic design of np-charts is the set of all integer values
of (n,h,d). The variables n and d are clearly discrete integers. In Duncan [11] and Chiu
[10], the variable his defined with hours as the unit of time. They do not require integer
values ofh for their solutions. In this paper, h is defined in time units that are muhiples of
the time required to produce one unit. It is reasonable to sample in integer intetvals of the
amount of time required to produce one unit.

The variables n, h, and d must have the

following relationships: d<n5h. If h<n, then not enough units are produced during the
intetval between samples to provide a sample of size n. If ~d, then the acceptance
number is larger than the sample size so out-of-control points can not posSioly occur.
Some of the feasible combinations of (n,h,d) are shown in Figure 1. This figure also
shows that only three other combinations are adjacent to the (1,1,0). They are (1,2,0),
(2,2,0) and (2,2,1). If self-checks are optimal, the cost at (1,1,0) must be less than or
equal to the adjacent designs, although that alone may not be sufficient.

<<< Figure 1 about here >>>

Given the complexity of the models, it may not posSI'ble to show that F(n,h,d) and L(n,h,d)
are convex over the relevant range of integer values. Figure 2 shows a plot of L(n,h,d)
using the parameters from Duncan's

[11] example number one.

The function is
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increasing in all three variables in the vicinity of (1,1,0). This is typical of the examples
we have encountered.

<<< Figure 2 about here>>>

Shingo was involved in Toyota's realization that setup reduction is critical to nT. A
significant parallel exists between nT and self-checks. To create a situation where
EOQ=1, you can increase the holding cost rate, the cost of the product or reduce annual
demand, or set up cost. Of these, some are not easily controlled by management. Others
are not desirable, like reducing annual demand. Only one change is both under managerial
control and desirable: reducing setup cost.

Likewise, to create a situation where an np-

chart of(l,l,O) is optimal, many model parameters can be changed.

Using a simple line search, parameters from Duncan's and Chiu's examples were used to
find indifference points where self-checks (ie., the (1,1,0) design) and an adjacent design
had equal and minimum costs. The various model parameters were changed one-at-a-time,
holding all other parameter values constant. The results are presented in Table 1 below.
The table shows which variables could be altered to cause ( 1, 1,0) to be optimal Unlike
the basic EOQ formula, the cost functions have multiple terms in their numerators and
denominators. Thus, when model parameters are reduced to zero or increased by several
orders of magnitude, the impact on the model may not be sufficient to make (1,1,0)
minimum cost. Those parameters for which no value exists that makes the cost of the
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(1,1,0) design less than or equal to all three adjacent designs are indicated with a dash.
For those parameters for which an indifference point exists, the change in the parameter
value is indicated along with the effect of that change on the cost function value. In each
case where an indifference point was found, it was between (1,1,0) and (2,2,0).

It should be noted that since inspecting production after the

met by itself does not make

production proceed more rapidly, the cost of self-checks was assumed to be non-negative.
While the feedback provided by inspection can resuh in process improvements that increase the
rate ofproduction, this indirect effect was not considered

<<< Table 1 about here>>>

An examination of Table 1 shows that the following changes to the model parameters tend
to make the use of self-checks (ie., the (1,1,0) sampling design) more economically
attractive:
•
•
•
•
•
•

decreasing fixed cost of inspection
increasing the size of process shifts
increasing the rate of arrivals of process shifts
increasing the cost of being out of control
increasing the time to produce one unit
increasing the time required to take samples.

Of the changes in model parameters that made self-checks more economically appealing,
only decreasing the fixed cost of inspection, and increasing the size of the process shift
resulted in decreasing the optimal cost function value. Clearly, none of the last five
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changes would normally be considered a sensible approach to process improvement.
Hence, the results of this analysis closely parallel the results in

m.

Reductions in

inspection cost do for np-charts what setup reduction does for EOQ.

Another insight from this analysis is that without managerial action to reduce the cost of
inspection, use of self-checks is probably not cost minimizing. A manager who decides to
do self-checks instead of np-charts is likely to experience increased costs. Specifically,
inspection and type I error costs are likely to go up because of the increased sampling
intensity.

4. The economics of source inspection.

Source inspection insures that a condition that will lead to a defect does not go undetected

In situations where the defect can occur if and only ifthe condition exists, source inspection for
that condition will eliminate the particular type of defect. Performing the source inspection
may be costly because production may be slowed by using poka-yokE devices. As noted in §1,
source inspection is one form of what Norman [5] calls "forcing :fimctions". Norman discusses
forcing :fimctions in the context of designing everyday things. He reports that forcing :fimctions
may make the process slower. ''If a forcing :fimction is really desired, it is usually possible to
find one, ahhough at some cost to normal behavior. It is important to think through the
implications ofthat cost... " [5, p.134]. '%e clever designer has to minimire the nuisance value
while retaining the safety, forcing-:fimction mechanism, to guard against the occasional
tragedy." [5, p.l37].
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Iyer and Vecchia [12] provide a model for optimally inspecting a two state discrete time
system When a process is in state 0 the process is operating properly and output from the
process is acceptable. When the process is in state 1, the process is not functioning properly
and defective output resuhs. Once in state 1, the process remains in that state until an operator
intervenes to reset the process. Three costs are considered:

ci = cost of an inspection,
C =cost of repair or adjustment,

cd = loss due to non-confonning unit.

Let n represent the inspection interval. If 1F 1, then 100% inspection would be used. Let
q= 1-p, \\here p be the probability of failure, that is, the probability of changing from state 0 to

state 1.

lyer and Vecchia provide a derivation ofthe long-term cost per unit ofthe inspection interval n,
which is

]1-q"

q
q"
Q(n)= [ C,+C,--Cd
--+C,-+Cd.
p
n
n

(1)

Iyer and Vecchia were interested in the general sohrtion to this problem, their model is

discussed here for the specific pwpose of finding conditions necessary for 100% inspection to
be optimal They indicate that 100% inspection is optimal \\hen
(2)
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This condition is correct, but more restrictive than necessary. Their own examples show

circumstances \\here the left hand side of(2) is greater than zero and n=1 is still optimal

The maximum acceptable cost for 100% source inspection (ie. n=1) occurs \\hen the long run
total cost per unit is less than or equal to the total cost per unit of 50% source inspection (ie.,
n=2). Using equation (1), the long term cost per unit \\hen n=1 is set less than or equal to the
long term cost per unit \\hen n=2 and then solving for C; yields:
(3)
This in tum leads to

cl ~ 0

\\hen
(4)

Consider the poka-yoke device used by GM as a source inspection for the presence of nuts in
the welding machine. In this context, C; is the cost of performing the source inspection. This
cost could be the result of decreased output resulting from implementing the source inspection.
In the GM example, the source inspection may not involve any marginal cost per unit.

C, is

the cost to change the process from state 1 to state 0. In the GM example, it is the cost to
tmjam the chute that delivers nuts. Conceivably, bumping the machine might be enough to jar
the nuts loose. cd is the cost oflost production \\hen the machine stops.

Suppose that in the GM example, the cost of correcting any misfeeding or jamming of the
machine cost $1. The cost of a defect, a body panel sent downstream without a nut in place, is
$20. Prior to implementing source inspection, the probability of a missing nut is p=0.005.
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Using equation (3), the maximum economic cost of inspection can be found to be $0.099475.
Unless the cost per unit of inspecting exceeded this amount, source inspection should be
implemented. Conversely, if initially the cost of inspection exceeded this amount, The pokayoke device used to reduce the cost of inspection would need to reduce it to this less than

$0.099475. The behavior of the maximum economic C, as p changes is shown in Ftgure 3.
The larger cd relative to c,, the higher the maximum of the curve. The maximum economic c,
converges to zero asp decreases for all parameter values. When p is small, the value of C, has
minimal effect on CJ.

<<<Figure 3 about here>>>

Typically, one expects all three costs to be positive. However, C, can reasonably be negative if
it expedites the production process. An example of such a scenario was obsenred by the

authors at a railcar manufacturer. Workers would prepare to weld various parts onto the
railcar chassis by using a measuring tape and chalk to determine the location where the parts
were to be welded. As part of their TQM implementation process, the team that performed
this task was asked to find a way to position the parts and weld them without using a
measuring tape. The team designed and fabricated a jig with cut-outs in the locations where
the parts go. The jig is accurately positioned on the chassis using stops attached to the back of
the jig. The parts are then placed in the cut-outs and spot welded in place. After the jig is
removed, welding is completed. The use of the jig has eliminated measurement error and also
makes missing parts obvious. It takes less time to position and use the jig than to find the
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location of each part by measuring, so the cost of this source inspection device is actually
negative.

5. Conclusions
An analysis of seif:.checks and source inspection with attn"bute quality data has shown that
fililsafing or ZQC is not economical under all circumstances. In order for these techniques
to be economical, the cost of inspection must be relatively low.

Self-checks were shown to be a special case of np-chart. The :fixed cost of inspection is the
only model parameter that both reduces the total cost of the sampling plan and is capable of
making seif:.checks the minimum cost sampling plan.

The other model parameters either

increase the cost of the sampling plan, are not controllable, or do not make seif:.checks cost
minimizing. Without managerial action to reduce the fixed cost of inspection, the use of
self-checks is probably not cost minimizing. If self-checks are used without reducing the
cost of inspection then the likely result will be increased type I error costs and increased
inspection costs.

The use of source inspection also requires that inspection costs are low. Specifically, the
cost of inspection must be low relative to the cost of repairs and adjustments and to the
cost of producing defects. The maximum cost of inspection such that source inspection is
minimum cost is characterized. The maximum inspection cost is concave in the probability
of failure. When the probability is high, the maximum inspection cost may be negative.
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Negative inspection costs are possible since situations exist where the production rate can
increase as a result of source inspection.

Shingo's assertion that ZQC with 100% inspection is superior to traditional SPC is not
economically justifiable. This research has shown that the 100% inspection required by
ZQC will not be economically preferable unless certain conditions are satisfied. In some
cases, managerial action to reduce inspection costs will be insufficient to make ZQC
preferred. Indeed, self-checks and successive checks have been shown to be a special case
of SPC. Further, source inspection can be used to be proactive about variance reduction
regardless of the type of informative inspection used

This paper has addressed the use of failsafing with processes that are controlled using
attnoute data. Future research will examine how failsafing and measurement data control
charts are related, and under what circumstances failsafing is effective and economical
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Appendix

This appendix provides the notation and models developed by Duncan [11] and Chiu [10].
Duncan's notation follows:

b = Fixed cost of inspection
c = variable cost of inspection
D = average hours required to find an assignable cause
g = hours per item on average to test the sample
M = loss per hour due to increased percentage of defects
p o = proportion defective when process is in-control
P• = proportion defective when process is out-of-control
T = cost of determining a false alarm
W = average cost to find an assignable cause
8 = the size of the process shift in standard deviations

A. = the arrival rate of process shifts, exponentially distributed.

L(n h d)= AMB+MT+A.W +!+en
' '
1+AB
h h

(5)

where
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(8)

h
B=--r+gn+D

(9)

a·e-Ah
1-e-Ah

(10)

p

A=

------:c:-

Chiu's notation follows:

n = sample size
d = acceptance number. If the number of defects exceeds d, it indicates the Jikely presence of
an assignable cause.
A. =the anival rate per hour ofthe assignable cause

Po = Proportion of defective items
Pt =increased proportion defective caused by a single assignable cause
~ = average

search cost for assignable cause \Wen none exists

At = average search cost required to find and correct an assignable cause \Wen one exists

to = search time for assignable cause \Wen none exists
t 1 =time required to find and correct an assignable cause \Wen one exists
Vo =profit per hour earned \Wen process is in control
V1 = profit per hour earned \Wen process is out of control
b+cn = cost ofinspection is a linear function ofn

2S

The total cost :fimctions ofChiu's model is

F(n, h, d)
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Fig. 1. Feasible Solutions to the economic design of np-charts. Points adjacent to selt:
checks (1,1,0) are located at (1,2,0), (2,2,0), and (2,2,1). Infeasible solutions are marked
withNA
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Fig. 2. Numerical values of the cost function L(n,h,d) for duncan's model number 1
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